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...OR WOULD YOU RATHER HAVE WHAT'S
BEHIND DOOR NUMBER TWO? UNIFORM
CHOICE OF LAW PROPOSALS: BIG DEAL
OF THE DAY OR JUST ANOTHER
ZONK?
ROBERTJ. WITTE*

PICTURE THE golden age of the television game show.
A couple in their mid-thirties dresses up as chickens
for the entire national television audience to see. Monty
Hall, the host of "Let's Make a Deal"' has just given them
$100, much to their fowlish delight. Then, however,
Monty offers the chance to give back their cash in exchange for what's behind "Door Number Two." It's now
decision time - behind that door could be a trip, more
money, a new car or another glamorous prize. However,
there could also be a "zonk" awaiting them - an old
goat, an oversized baby buggy, or quite appropriately, a
bucket of chicken. The contestant's option is between a
sure thing and the unknown.
* B.A. University of Oklahoma, J.D. Southern Methodist University. Associate,
Winstead Sechrest & Minick P.C., Dallas, Texas. The author expresses his gratitude to Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University, for her advice and direction in the preparation of this article.
"Let's Make a Deal" was an award-winning game show that ran for 4,500 episodes from 1963 - 1986 (NBC 1963 - 1968; ABC 1968 - 1976; syndication 1971 1976, 1980 - 1982, 1984 - 1986) and featured Monty Hall as host and Jay Stewart
as announcer. On the show, contestants dressed in outrageous outfits were given
an initial prize, and then asked whether they wanted to "deal" away that prize for
some unknown treasure either in a box or behind door number one, two or three.
At times, something valuable would be waiting, while some contestants traded for
prizes of no real value, called "zonks." Some contestants chose the safe way out,
settling for a known quantity. Others were more daring.
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Although most practitioners or scholars would not
likely equate the current state of choice of law to the $100
held by a couple of human chickens, current choice of law
at least represents a sure thing. Despite its drawbacks, the
current system's strengths and weaknesses are for the
most part well known. For over thirty years, however, various commentators have proposed that choice of law be
federalized, or at least made uniform among states. 2
Some articles have called for an all-encompassing uniform
choice of law standard, while others have recommended
that action be taken only in specific areas, such as "mass
tort" litigation.4 In response, some scholars argue that
such proposals would not avoid the dilemmas posed by
the current system. These commentators instead suggest
that federalizing choice of law would be an affront to state
sovereignty and that a new uniform provision would result in an immense amount of unneeded litigation.5 All
2 See, e.g., Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14
UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System,
16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Henry M. Hart,Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
3 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
4 In the past few years, dozens of articles, comments and notes have discussed
the need for some type of uniform federal standard to govern both substantive
law and choice of law in mass-tort litigation. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of
Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating the
Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View From the Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV.
535 (1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law For Mass-Tort Litigation, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1623 (1992); Thomas M. Reavley &Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule
For New Reasons: Place of Injury as a Federal Solution to Choice of Law in Single-Accident
Mass Tort Cases, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium, Conflict of Laws and Complex
Litigation Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129 (1989); William D.
Torchiana, Choice of Law and the Multistate Class: Forum Interests in Matters Distant,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1986); Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of
Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive
Problems in Complex Litigation Arising From Disasters, 5 ToURo L. REV. 1 (1988); Paul
S. Bird, Note: Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96
YALE L.J. 1077 (1986); Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class
Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort
Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457 (1989).
See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing
Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76, 95 (1989).
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sides do agree that no one can predict with certainty the
repercussions which would follow such change.
Part I of this paper will describe the current choice of
law system, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses.
Part II will outline some of the proposals to bring uniformity to choice of law, both on an overall and piecemeal
basis. Part III will describe some current political realities
which will keep any changes from taking place in the near
future, and possibly for a long time to come. This article
concludes that despite the frustration experienced by
practitioners and although a number of well envisioned
proposals to simplify choice of law are on the table, reality
dictates that we will not see a uniform choice of law system for a long time, if ever. The "chickens" just are not
willing to take the risk.
I.

THE CURRENT CHOICE OF LAW SYSTEM:
MONEY IN THE HAND - IS IT ENOUGH,
OR SHOULD WE MAKE A BETTER
DEAL?

Choice of law questions arise when a dispute falls under
state law and involves persons, parties, or transactions
connected to more than one state. 6 When the law applicable to the dispute differs between the states (thus leading
to a potentially different result depending upon which law
applies), a choice of law rule guides 7 the court in determining which state law to apply. Such situations occur
most frequently in tort cases (including airline disasters),'
but are also quite common in contracts and internal cor6

ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAwS

1-12 (1987).

7 Although the various choice of law provisions appear to simply guide the

courts toward selecting the proper applicable law, they often allow the court to
manipulate various factors and considerations in order to produce a "favorable"
result.
8 In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C. on January 13, 1982, 559 F.
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732
(C.D. Cal. 1975); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for

Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991); Ross D. Cooper, Corn-
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porate affairs. 9 As society has shifted its focus from intrastate to interstate commerce and activity, the number of
potential choice of law situations has skyrocketed. Recently, Michael H. Gottesman stated:
In the modern era, virtually every American engages in
hundreds of transactions a day with the potential to trigger a lawsuit requiring a choice between multiple states'
laws: every product used that was made out-of-state, every
ment, The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in FederalMultidistrict Litigation, 57 GEo.
WASH.

L.

REV.

1145 (1989).

A frequently studied choice of law exercise illustrates the problems which can
arise in an airline situation. Consider the following:
(1) On February 1, 1975, a cook in Alaska handled ham to be served
aboard the flight. The cook had blisters infected with staphylococcus. The ham was kept at room temperature for six hours during
preparation.
(2) In Tokyo, 343 passengers boarded the flight. While the plane
was flying toward Anchorage for refueling, the food trays were
stored at 50 degrees overnight. Staphylococcus multiplies at temperatures above 40 degrees and produces a toxin that causes food
poisoning.
(3) The trays were loaded at Anchorage, and the plane took off for
Copenhagen, its next stop.
(4) The trays were heated in a 300 degree oven for fifteen minutes,
a treatment that will not destroy the toxin, and the passengers were
served. Those who ate contaminated food began to experience the
symptoms of food poisoning as the plane approached Copenhagen.
(5) In Copenhagen, 144 passengers disembarked ill. The rest flew
on to Paris. Another 51 of these later became ill.
A series of choice-of-law problems are then posited with regard to
a passenger who (a) arranged a tour of Japan by telephone from
Michigan through American Express in New York, and left from Detroit Metropolitan Airport for Japan, (b) arranged while in Tokyo,
through the American Express office there, to take a different flight
and include Europe in the passenger's travels, (c) boarded in Tokyo,
(d) ate the contaminated food, which was loaded in Anchorage,
while flying over Canada, (e) landed in Copenhagen, where the passenger began to fell ill but refused medical attention, and (0 continued on to Paris, where the passenger became violently ill and died.
JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 38-39 (2d ed. 1984),
as cited in Mullenix, supra note 4, at 1642.
11Gottesman, supra note 8, at 1-2. In discussing the broadness of the scope of
choice of law, Larry Kramer remarked that choice of law is not "limited to car
accidents and slip-and-fall cases ....
[but] also concerns marriage, divorce, child
custody, abortion, criminal law, welfare, education, and innumerable other matters ....
[It] defines the scope of the whole corpus of a state's law, and in this way
it defines the scope of the community itself." Larry Kramer, On the Need For 4
Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2136 (1991).
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out-of-state motorist passed on the highway, every activity
undertaken while visiting another state, and so forth.'"
The escalation in actual and potential choice of law cases
seems to have brought the current choice of law system
under increased scrutiny.
Choice of law issues have long been treated by the
Supreme Court as matters of state law, a view initially fueled by Justice Story" and Justice Brandeis.' 2 Justice
Brandeis, twenty-two years prior to his famous opinion in
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,' 3 held in Kryger v. Wilson 4 that
choice of law questions were a matter of local common
law.' 5 There are, however, many who disagree with this
10Gottesman,

supra note 8, at 1.

11 See Trautman, supra note 4, at 1716-17. Trautman discusses the influence of
Dutch theory on Justice Story, stating that he "analogized the states to European
nations." Id. Story is described as having a "predilection for national authority,"
but Trautman says that two of his decisions, The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 438 (1819) (holding that home port liens are governed by state law) and
The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (denying federal admiralty
law jurisdiction over a suit for wages earned on a river-traveling vessel), seemed
to favor state authority. Trautman states that Justice Story "was the first of many
great judges to contribute to [the] unfortunate view [that choice of law should be
treated as a matter of state law] ... perhaps his views on admiralty jurisdiction...
and on diversity jurisdiction blinded him to the true nature of this problem." Id. at
1716; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965
SuP. CT. REV. 241, 258-62 (discussing influence of Dutch and Continental Theory
on Justice Story's conflicts jurisprudence).
2 Trautman, supra note 4, at 1716-17.
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
242 U.S. 171 (1916). In Kryger a dispute arose between the purchaser and the
vendor of a piece of land in North Dakota which led to an action to quiet title.
Under North Dakota (forum and location of property) law, the purchaser's contract to acquire the land was effectively canceled; whereas under Minnesota (place
of contracting and performance) law, the purchase contract remained enforceable. Upholding the North Dakota court's decision to apply its own law in favor of
the vendor, Justice Brandeis declared:
The most that the [vendee] can say is that the state court made a
mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws in deciding
that the cancel[l]ation [sic] of a land contract is governed by the law
of the situs instead of the place of making and performance. But
that, being purely a question of local common law, is a matter with
which this court is not concerned.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added), as quoted in Trautman, supra note 4, at 1717. Trautman believes that the "demands of justice in multistate transactions call for further significant encroachments on Justice Brandeis' Kryger view." Id. at 1718.
15 Id. at 1716.
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treatment, and who argue that choice of law should be a
federal matter because the interests of two or more states
are involved.' 6 Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., in arguing
the federal nature of choice of law, went so far as to quote
a passage from The Federalist Papers, in which Alexander
Hamilton argues that "cases in which 'one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens' should
be heard in national courts, in order to assure evenhandedness and to avoid bias."' 17 Although none of the
proponents argue that such cases should be heard exclusively in national courts, they do yearn for federal standards. The proponents claim that federal standards
would offer an escape from a situation in which:
the substantive laws of the various states have grown more
divergent; the choice of law rules the state courts have applied in the absence of federal command have become
chaotic producers of waste and unfairness; and the
Supreme Court's relaxation of the Constitutional constraints on state court jurisdiction and state court application of forum law have intensified the forum shopping and
forum-preference in selection of law that lie at the heart of
the present problem.18
Other commentators do not advocate federal action but
argue for uniformity in choice of law through either a new
Restatement, a Uniform Choice of Law Code (similar in
format to the Uniform Commercial Code), or a set of Multistate Canons of Construction, any of which could be
adopted by the states themselves.' 9
Since choice of law is presently treated as a matter of
state law, each of the fifty states has its own choice of law
16 See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and
Federal Common Law, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Spring 1977); Baxter, supra
note 2, at 73; Hart, supra note 2, at 539-42; Horowitz, supra note 2, at 1193-94.
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961) quotedfrom Hart, supra note 2, at 514. Hart, discussing federal diversity jurisdiction, professed, "[t]he questions are essentially federal, in the sense that
they involve ... more than one state." Hart, supra note 2, at 514.
H

Gottesman, supra note 8, at 2.

See infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
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provision. These provisions fall into certain categories
which are briefly described below.
1. The First Restatement,2 ° published in 1934, is based
on Joseph Beale's "vested rights" doctrine that a legal
right "vests" only when the last event takes place which is
necessary to give rise to that right, and that the law applicable to a specific dispute should be that of the jurisdiction where that "last event" took place.2 ' The First
Restatement therefore identifies both the "vesting event"
and the proper jurisdiction (e.g., place of contracting) for
a number of different legal categories (e.g., contracts),
and recommends that the court apply the law of that jurisdiction without scrutinizing the substance of that particular law.2
2. The Second Restatement,23 released in 1971, sought to
work some flexibility into the First Restatement framework
by turning its territorial rules into initial presumptions,
which would be weighed along with other factors, including the interests of the various states, to choose the law of
the jurisdiction with the "most significant contacts to the
controversy. '2 4 Although the Second Restatement does
specify a number of relevant guiding factors,25 it does not
20

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter

referred to

as

RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].
21 Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 9-10; see 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73, at 1967-70 (1935); see also LEA BRILMAYER, CON-

FLICT OF LAWS:

FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS § 1.2, at 18-22 (1991)

(summarizing Beale's vested rights theory).
22 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) §§ 311-40, 377, 384.
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971)

[hereinafter RESTATE-

MENT (SECOND)].
24

Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 14.

Among the "factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law" listed
in Section 6 of the Second Restatement are:
25

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f)certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.

624

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[59

state any relative weight they should be given by the court
in making its determination. 6
3. Brainerd Currie's "Interest Analysis" is based on the
underlying premise that when states' laws conflict, it is
state interests, and not individual rights, that are of concern. 27 Currie felt that a particular law did not need to be
applied unless doing so would further the policy behind
the creation of that law. 28 He argued that the court
should analyze these state interests by first looking at the
rationale behind the legal standard of each state, and then
examining the various contacts of the parties to each
state.29 In some situations, called "false conflicts", only
one state would be interested in having its law govern,
and that law would apply.3 0 In "true conflict" scenarios,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6.

26 Michael Gottesman described the Second Restatement as a "hodgepodge of all
theories" and stated that the court's mission under this provision is to "compare
apples, oranges, umbrellas, and pandas, and determine which state's law to apply
by the relative importance assigned to these factors." Gottesman, supra note 8, at
8. Gottesman does not seem to approve of the Second Restatement. He asserts:
The supposed virtue of the Second Restatement was the freedom it provided courts to weigh all conceivably relevant factors and then tailor
the choice of law to the circumstances of the case. That very flexibility was, however, equally its vice: courts could arrive at any outcome
applying its factors, and no one could predict in advance what state's
law governed their actions. The problem was not merely that courts
were afforded the opportunity to be manipulative; the problem was
that even a court without such desire could find in the Second Restatement no guidance as to how it was to decide a case after identifying
the factors in play.
Id. Lea Brilmayer compares the Second Restatement to the comedian's definition of
a camel: "a horse drafted by a committee." BRILMAYER, supra note 21, at 68. The
general consensus of the critics is that the Second Restatement is too vague to be of
any help. However, this generality does give judges the flexibility to make proper
decisions without being constrained by an uncompromising choice of law

provision.
27 Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 11-12.

Id.
Id. at 12; see Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963) (hereinaf28
29

ter SELECTED ESSAYS). It is interesting that Currie wrote: "We would be better off
if Congress were to give some attention to problems of private law, and were to

legislate concerning the choice between conflicting state interests in some of the
specific areas in which the need for solutions is serious." Id.
3o Id.
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the court should apply forum law. l In certain "unprovided for" cases, where neither state would have an interest in applying its own law, the law of the forum would be
applied. 2
4. Robert Leflar's "Better Law" doctrine branches off
of Currie's interest analysis. Leflar argued that in "true
conflicts" cases, the court
should choose what it perceives
33
to be the "better law."
5. William Baxter's "Comparative Impairment" doctrine is yet another offshoot of Currie's interest analysis.
Baxter believed that under "true conflict" circumstances,
the court should select the law of the state
whose interests
34
would be hurt the most if not selected.
One recent survey shows that fourteen states still apply
the territorial rules of the First Restatement, twenty-three
follow the "smorgasbord" approach of the Second Restatement, six employ some type of Currie's interest analysis,
four use Leflar's "better law" approach, two presume that
forum law applies, and one (California) adopts Baxter's
comparative impairment variant of Currie's interest analysis.35 Although this lack of uniformity seems mind boggling on its own, it is just the tip of the iceberg. Not all
states which use the same test do so in the same manner.
For example, of the twenty-three states that follow the Second Restatement approach, each state (and each court within
that state) is free to give as much weight to each individual
factor as it sees fit.3 6 In addition, some states may fluctuate between approaches depending on which will achieve
Id.
I3

Gottesman, supra note 8, at 6. This could be the case if the law of the plaintiff's domicile supported the defendant, and the law of the defendant's domicile
would be beneficial to the plaintiff.
3'

33

L.

Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL.

REV.

1584, 1586-88 (1966).

s4 Baxter, supra note 2, at 42.
35 Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 16. Lea Brilmayer mentions that any
such survey should be regarded merely as suggestive, as courts in the various jurisdictions "are not always consistent or perfectly coherent." Brilmayer, supra note
21, at 68.

-" Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 17.
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an "equitable" result in the case before them. 37 The result is a system in which the choice of law regime of most
states is "either inherently indeterminate or subject to so
many exceptions as to make it indeterminate as
applied. "38
Both practitioners and scholars have bemoaned the current state of choice of law. 39 As early as 1953, William
Prosser stated that "the realm of the conflict of laws is a
dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon ... the ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost
when engulfed and entangled in it."' 40 Critics claim that
37

Id.

Id.
39 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING

38

§ 70, at 207-11 (1984) (discussing the system's lack of a theoretical foundation, which causes the courts to often appear biased); Lea Brilmayer,
Picking and Choosing: Time For a Change in Modern Choice of Law Theory? 4 BENCHMARK 45 (1988) (noting the twist of irony in the fact that choice of law, a legal field
which has been at times overwhelmed by academic commentary, is nonetheless
one of the most confusing); Gottesman, supra note 8, at 11-12 & n.42 (citing ten
choice of law scholars criticizing the current system); P. John Kozyris, Forward to
the Symposium on Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 458 (1985)
(claiming that "[t]he conflicts misery index, which is the ratio of problems to solutions, or of verbiage to result, is now higher than ever"); Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 344 (1990) (stating that the courts have
"failed . . . due mostly to the conceptual fog that has enshrouded choice of law
with the misguided goal of finding a neutral theory of 'conflicts justice'," and asserting that "[i]t is time to abandon this fruitless venture and frankly recognize
that choice of law requires accommodating the equally legitimate claims of different states to govern"); Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 770 (1987) (claiming that certainty in
the field of conflict of laws is as good as dead); Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4,
at 17 (calling the system a "colossal jurisprudential failure"); Kastenmeier &
Geyh, supra note 4, at 542 (stating that trying to figure out the current system is
often as frustrating as "trying to tattoo soap bubbles").
40 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 1 (citing William Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51
MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953)). Gottesman humorously notes that "agricultural
metaphors have liberally fertilized the conflicts literature." Id. at 2 & n.5; see also
CONFLICT OF LAWS

WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND

LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF

LAws (1942) (calling for the "removal of weeds from the intellectual garden");
Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
10 (1977) ("well-watered plateau"); David F. Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1170, 1172-73 (1943) (referring to Cook's lack of solutions, stating "all our
gardeners are weeders and none planters").
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not only is the existing structure confusing, but that it also
fosters unpredictability, yields nonuniform and inconsistent outcomes, encourages forum-shopping, wastes time
and judicial resources, and allows states to protect their
own parochial interests at all cost.
Unpredictability: Because each state has essentially its
own approach to choice of law, the system often produces
unpredictable outcomes. Currently, parties do not know
what laws govern their conduct until they are called into
court (which most do not expect to occur in the first
place). This lack of certainty can eventually have the negative effect of discouraging beneficial interstate activity.4
Although some states allow parties to specify which law
would regulate any dispute between them, the choice of
law rules of some states do not. In addition, this option is
obviously not available in nonconsensual transactions.42
Another factor which gives rise to unpredictability is a
lack of understanding of choice of law rules by attorneys,
clerks, andjudges. Patrick E. Bradley, a trial attorney with
the Aviation and Admiralty Division of the United States
Department of Justice (Civil Division, Torts Branch), has
dealt with conflicts issues for eight years. Using interest
analysis as an example, Bradley states, "it is frequently the
case that the courts don't understand I.A. and neither do
the lawyers. Instead, a judge in an interest analysis jurisdiction will frequently speak of the 'contacts' of the various parties, and apply the law which the judge feels
produces the most favorable result. ' 43 As a result, the
difference between success and failure in the courtroom
4' Kramer, supra note 9, at 2137. Kramer adds that "because (the discouragement of desirable interstate activity) is bad for all states, all states should have an
interest in devising a choice of law system that provides predictable, uniform
treatment of multistate cases." Id.
42 Id. at 2137 & n.10.
41 Interview with Patrick E. Bradley, Trial Attorney in the Aviation/Admiralty
Division of the United States Department ofJustice (Civil Division, Torts Branch),
in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 19, 1993, and follow-up Dec. 14, 1993) (hereinafter
referred to as Bradley interview) (statements attributed to Mr. Bradley throughout
this article are based on his own personal opinion and do not in any way reflect an
official stance of the United States Department of Justice).
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could depend on how a particularjudge feels on any given
day.
Lack of Uniformity/Inconsistency of Results: It makes sense
that a system which is attacked for being unpredictable
would also be assailed for producing nonuniform, inconsistent results. Ours is a structure in which three passengers could be sitting beside one another in an airplane
that crashes, killing all three. If the three are domiciled in
different states, it is possible that in one case, the airline
could be found negligent and required to pay the family
of passenger number one full compensation. In the case
of passenger number two, the airline could be found negligent and ordered to pay only $50,000 (or amount allowed by the particular state statute limiting damages).
Alternatively, the airline could be found free of negligence with the family of passenger number three footing
the litigation costs. The inconsistent treatment of these
families is unfair, an opinion echoed by practitioners and
academics alike. 4 For example, Professors Robert Sedler
and Aaron Twerski state the problem of inconsistency by
stating: "[A]s long as there can be multiple litigation in
different states on the same underlying claim, there is also
the possibility of 'inconsistent results' due to different dispositions. Juries in different states, operating under the
same applicable law, may resolve questions of fact and lia'45
bility differently."
Forum shopping: In cases where the incident or transaction that gives rise to the dispute has contacts with more
than one state, the plaintiff often has the opportunity to
select the state in which to file the lawsuit. Critics complain that this allows plaintiffs to "forum-shop," choosing
the jurisdiction with the most favorable substantive law
and choice of law provisions. This opportunity is not,
44 See, e.g., Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 551-52 (arguing that "fundamental fairness" is not achieved in this situation); Reavley & Wesevich, supra note
4, at 23-24 (arguing that "fairness demands that parties to cases concerning identical facts be treated equally under the law").
4.-Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 551 (quoting Sedler & Twerski, supra
note 5).

1994]

CHOICE OF LA W PROPOSALS

629

however, available to defendants. It is argued that this
practice of interstate forum shopping has resulted from a
series of independent decisions, including:
(the decision) of state governments to enact long-arm statutes that make distant defendants amenable to service of
process,46 (the decision) of the Supreme Court that the
Constitution permits state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants with very minimal contacts to
the states, 47 and (the decision) of the Supreme Court in
Klaxon that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law
rules 48
of the state in which they sit to decide diversity
cases.

Therefore, the ability of the plaintiff to select a fortuitous
forum appears to be an unintentional "consequence of
federalism ' 49 that has no policy justification. This forum
shopping puts the defendant at the immediate disadvantage of being called into a court in the jurisdiction that the
plaintiff has determined will be most favorable to his
claim. As a result, there is a chance that the case may
wind up in a forum which is uneconomical and which has
attenuated contacts with the cause of action.5 °
Some scholars and practitioners, however, argue that
the dangers of forum shopping are exaggerated." BradReavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 26 & n.130, (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
CODE ANN. §§ 17.042-.045 (Vernon 1986); LA. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13.3201-.3207 (West 1991)).
47 Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 26 & n. 131, (citing Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-16 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of transient jurisdiction) & Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (ruling that
corporation is "subject to" state jurisdiction where it had no physical presence,
but "deliberately created continuing obligations between itself and parties" in
that state)).
4' Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 26-27 & n.132 (citing Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)).
49 Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 27. The authors add: "the present system only benefits the plaintiffs whose attorneys, through some combination of
luck and skill, file suit in the state court that picks the law most favorable to their
clients. The random distribution of this substantive advantage betrays its accidental and reasonless origin." Id. at 28.
16

REM.

-0 Kramer, supra note 39, at 313-14.
5' Id. at 313; see, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Auto-

mation in the Conflict of Laws, in

SELECTED

EsSAYS, supra note 29, at 168-69; Robert
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ley, of the United States Department of Justice, agrees5"
and maintains that a few isolated examples are made to
look like common practice. In support of his theory,
Bradley states,
I have only experienced one case, and know of very few
others in which the choice of forum alone determined
(major legal issues in the case). Most states use interest
analysis or the Second Restatement (as their choice of law
provision), which gives the judge leeway. All that said,
very few judges are stupid enough to let the choice of forum dictate who wins (a lawsuit). 3
While Bradley does not believe the system is perfect, he
contends that its evils are overstated.
Waste of Time and Resources: Critics claim that the current
choice of law system frequently leads to wasted time and
resources, belonging to both the parties and the courts.54
As discussed earlier, a plaintiff may choose to file the lawsuit in a distant state that has few minor contacts with the
defendant. As a result, the parties may spend a great deal
of time litigating jurisdiction before addressing the merits
of the case. If the case remains in the distant forum, the
parties must pay to try the case in a remote and inconvenient arena.55 If the case is dismissed or transferred, the
resources of the court and the parties have been wasted.
In addition, the parties may spend time and money litigating the proper application of the forum's indeterminate
choice of law provision (such as the Second Restatement or
interest analysis). This is especially improvident, if after a
A. Sedler, The Government Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 229 (1977).
52 Bradley interview, supra note 43.
5 Id. Bradley maintains that there are simply not that many cases where there
is a real choice to forum-shop on issues of great significance, with the major exception being when one state has a 51 % bar on contributory negligence or some
other limitation on damage recovery.
" As far back as 1945, Justice Robert Jackson stated, "we are so accustomed to
the delays, expense, and frustrations of our system that it seldom occurs to us to
inquire whether these are wise, or constitutionally necessary." Robert H. Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18
(1945).
55 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 12.
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trial on the merits, an appellate court finds that the trial
court erred in its choice of law determination.56
Protection of Forum-State Interests: Many choice of law approaches "include" the interests of other states in the
choice of law consideration. Critics assert, however, that
multistate interests are frequently ignored by courts seeking to further their own state policies, often protecting
residents against nonresidents.5 7 The Second Restatement
lists "the needs of the interstate and international systems" amongst its "factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law ' 5 8 and Baxter's Comparative Impairment scheme instructs the court to apply the law of
the state whose interests would be impaired most if its law
were to be applied. 59 However, courts can manipulate the
means of analysis used in their opinions.
Currie's interest analysis has opened the door for states
to protect their own parochial interests. In response to a
New York guest statute case, Neumeier v. Kuehner,60 in
which Chief Judge Fuld pronounced that compensating a
nonresident "at the expense of a New Yorker does not
further the substantive law purposes of New York, '"61
Donald T. Trautman stated, "[i]t is a perversion of a
proper interest analysis to allow it to be whittled down to
a concern for protecting the pocketbooks of residents at
the expense of outsiders. Such considerations have no
56 Id.

.1 Trautman, supra note 4, at 1721-26.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra notes 23, 25 at § 6(2)(a). Ten years before the
issuance of the Second Restatement, Justice Traynor acknowledged the need to recognize the concerns of other states, citing the court's responsibility to "give effect
to the common policy of both states .. .and sustain [a sister state's] interest in
protecting its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out of a transaction substantially related to that state without subordinating any legitimate interest of [the forum] state." Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 910 (Cal. 1961).
'19Baxter, supra note 2, at 42.
-" 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972). In this case, an automobile accident occurred in
Ontario, killing both the New York driver and his Ontario passenger. Suit was
brought in New York, because New York law would allow recovery. However, the
court ruled that since the passenger was not a New York resident, recovery could
not be had under the New York law. Id. at 458.
I Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458.
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place in the federal system." '62 In an Oregon spendthrift
statute case, Lilienthal v. Kaufman,63 the court's opinion
stated "[c]ourts are instruments of state policy"6 and "we
should apply the choice-of-law rule which will 'advance
the policies and interests of' Oregon. ' 65 Trautman
pronounced:
It is that attitude that I think should be expunged; courts
should not find solace in the notion that their function is
to do justice for residents. If the legislature has in fact
commanded preferences for local residents, that command must be overcome; the cleanest and most appropriate means to that end is the Supremacy Clause, giving
effect to a federal common law invalidating such self-serving doctrines.66
These types of cases give rise to the claim that the states
have not been responsible in exercising the latitude
granted them by the federal government in the area of
choice of law. However, since courts are able to disguise
the true justification underlying their determination, it is
uncertain how many opinions were based on this
rationale.
Defenders of the current choice of law system maintain
that although it is not perfect, it is a known quantity and
simply " 'built-into' our federal system." ' 67 Proponents of
the existing structure believe that deference to state sovereignty is proper and that the heterogeneity in state
choice of law rules simply reflects the dissimilarities in the
states, their citizens, and their needs. 68 Patrick Bradley
stated that
it makes sense for Washington to have different goals in its
62

Trautman, supra note 4, at 1723.

63 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).

I at 549.
Id.
Id. (quoting Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm.L. REV. 463, 474 (1960)).

A Reply

6(1 Trautman, supra note 4, at 1724. Trautman believes that a federal common
law would free state court judges from such "parochial and self-serving local
views." Id.
"7 Sedler & Twerski, supra note 5, at 95.

(i Id.
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choice of law structure than, say, North Carolina. The
states have different people, different industries, different
interests and different laws. Each state has the right to
have its interests given expression, and to deny that right
would be to deny we are a country of fifty different states.69
Advocates of the status quo argue that the system is not
that difficult for those who handle choice of law issues on
a regular basis and that many of the negative results arise
when attorneys and judges do not understand the various
choice of law provisions.70 In addition, they maintain that
many of those who have criticized the process have proposed nothing to take its place. Finally, it can be argued
that the hypotheticals that critics use to attack the system
are carefully crafted and often reflect extreme situations.
II.

BRINGING UNIFORMITY TO CHOICE OF LAW:
AN OFFER WE CAN'T REFUSE?

Although it is easy to stand on the sidelines complaining about the evils of the present choice of law system, some commentators have placed ideas "on the
table" for consideration. They almost unanimously seek
uniformity, but differ as to scope and method. Their
goals include predictability, consistency, efficiency, mutuality, and fairness. Each plan has its own distinct
strengths and weaknesses; some have been on the table
for quite some time, while others are quite new. These
propositions include (but are not limited to):
1) developing a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of Conflict of
Laws; 7' 2) drafting Multistate Canons of Construction for
conflict situations; 72 3) encouraging the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NC69 Bradley Interview, supra note 43.
70 Id. (noting that many areas of legal practice are intricate and quite difficult
for those practitioners who do not handle them on a regular basis).
71 BRILMAYER, supra note 21, at 185-89. Brilmayer addresses the possibility of a
Third Restatement and addresses its potential strengths and weaknesses. Brilmayer
does not, however, explicitly state that a new Restatement would be the best solution to the choice of law situation.
72 Kramer, supra note 39, at 320-38.
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CUSL), that produced the Uniform Commercial Code, to
promulgate a comprehensive treatment on choice of
law; 73 4) advocating that uniform federal choice of law

rules should be imposed by the federal courts; 74 and 5)
convincing Congress to adopt federal choice of law legislation, on an across the board or piecemeal basis in areas
such as "mass tort ' 75 or product liability.76
A.

POSSIBLE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS

Twenty-three states currently follow the Second Restatement in deciding choice of law issues, so on the surface it
would seem to make sense for the American Law Institute
to draft an updated provision that could be followed by all
fifty states. In discussing the possibility of such an occurrence, Lea Brilmayer said:
The Restatements enjoy numerous advantages in setting
out cooperative conflict of law solutions. First, because
the Restatements are comprehensive documents, they can
cover a broad enough range of topics to link issues on
which some states stand to benefit with issues on which
the others do. Also, because they are comprehensive, they
can be drafted to cover a wide range of contingencies and
also give clear guidance. Courts should not have to guess
too often about how cases ought to be decided because
the goal is cooperative behavior, and coordination is not
possible if the instructions are too vague. Third, the
membership of the American Law Institute is drawn from
all over the country and does not owe allegiance to a particular state or region. As a less political body than a typical state legislature, its solutions should reflect the
interests of the multistate system as a whole and be perceived as relatively neutral.
I.Kramer, supra note 9, at 2146-49. Note that Kramer has placed more than
one potential solution on the table. He can be compared to the fisherman who
puts more than one line in the water, hoping to get a bite on at least one of them.
74 See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g.,
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
76 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 27.
77 BRILMAYER, supra note 21, at 185.
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The actual name "restatement" also poses a problem.
Although some reform and modification can take place,
the drafters are "nonetheless bound to a considerable degree by existing decisions, "78 and are thus constrained to
restating the rules in effect today. After hearing scholars
and practitioners lambast the current structure, it is understandable why such an endeavor is unlikely to take
place. In addition, scholars such as Larry Kramer believe
that the advantages examined by Brilmayer could be
achieved through similar action by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), without the restraints which limit a Restatement
project.79 Other advantages of NCCUSL action in this
context are discussed later in this section.
The American Law Institute (ALI) has not been totally
silent on the choice of law issue, however. The ALI has
been working on a Complex Litigation Project, which would,
among other things, attempt to provide a federalized
choice of law provision for governing law in consolidated
and transferred "mass tort" cases.8 0 The project produced its third tentative draft in 1992.81
Proposed Multistate Canons of Constructionfor Conflict Situations: Choice of law scholar Larry Kramer has proposed
that courts can resolve true conflicts by developing Canons of Construction which could be established in the
theoretical framework of a "constructive multistate choice
of law compact."'8 2 The goal is to formulate a set of ca-

nons which would produce optimum results under the
78 Kramer, supra note 9, at 2148. Willis Reese, reporter for the Second Restatement, has been criticized for clinging to much of the First Restatement. In response,
he has stated that he would have liked to abandon it, but was limited in what he
could do by the existing decisions. Id.
7, Id.
80 A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, §§ 7.01-.08 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1992).
The ALI project is modeled after the Second Restatement, and has undergone major
revisions since its first draft. See Mullenix, supra note 4 (criticizing the ALI
proposals).

81 American Law Institute, supra note 80.
12

Kramer, supra note 39, at 280.
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particular circumstances.83 Kramer's proposition appears
to incorporate Currie's interest analysis in "false conflict"
and "unprovided for" cases, but Kramer does not specifically address this apparent incorporation.
The theoretical foundation behind the establishment of
multistate canons of construction is that there is no overarching principle which will provide the correct answer in
any given case."' In fact, Kramer argues the opposite,
that "true conflicts are difficult precisely because there is
no general theory against which to measure the justice of
the conflicting laws of different states. Because states are
co-equal sovereigns, true conflicts present a dispute between competing but equally legitimate versions of what
85
is just in a particular case."
Kramer believes that the canons should be adopted by
the state courts in legal areas where the state legislature
has been silent, and adds that the states would benefit
from: "(1) the advancement of multistate policies, (2) the
reduction of forum shopping [thus enhancing the predictability of the legal system], and (3) greater assurance that
each state's law is applied in the cases the state cares
,- Id. Kramer describes the canons as "background presumption[s] about the
legal system that [are] used to resolve uncertainty in interpretation." Id. at 320.
He says they are needed when state legislatures fail to specify how state courts
should integrate forum law with conflicting laws of other states. Id. at 318. According to Kramer, the canons would have to reflect the "kind of compromises
that co-equal sovereigns would be likely to make." Id. at 319.
84 Id. at 321. Kramer points to the Second Restatement in support of his belief that
it is a miscalculation to try to base a comprehensive choice of law scheme on some
global theory. He states:
The Second Restatement purports to derive presumptive rules from the
"theory" that the applicable law is the law of the state with the "most
significant relationship," which means the state that seems most entitled to have its law applied in light of an extensive list of factors.
This list includes about everything anyone ever suggested might be
meaningful to choice of law analysis - though with no explanations
of why any of these factors are in fact relevant. The "theory" of the
Second Restatement thus calls for the post hoc rationalizing of intuitions about whose law ought to apply. Unfortunately, since the Restatement provides no assistance in honing, organizing or explaining
these intuitions, its theoretical framework has no explanatory power.
Id. at 321-22 & n.149.
"- Id. at 280.
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about most."8 6
An initial set of canons is proposed, but Kramer encourages scholars and practitioners to articulate additional ones.8 7 Although he states that courts may apply
this initial set of canons, there seems to be hope that they
will be refined and incorporated into a Restatement or
other uniform provision.88 Kramer provides no other
specific details on how he envisions the canons would be
adopted. The proposed canons include:
"A. A Comparative Impairment Canon: If there is a
conflict between two states' laws, and failure to apply one
it practically ineffective, that law
of the laws would render
89
applied."
be
should
"B. A Substance/Procedure Canon: In a conflict between a substantive policy and a procedural policy, the
law reflecting the substantive policy should prevail unless
the forum's procedural interest is so strong that the forum
should dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. '"90
"C. A Canon for Contract Cases: In contracts cases,
true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the parties, or, if no express choice is made, by
applying whichever law validates the contract."'
at 319.
Id. at 322. Kramer's goal in proposing the canons seems to be to facilitate
discussion and debate. He does not pretend that his canons are a final product
that should be immediately adopted. New canons could evolve as courts face situations in which they are needed and scholars could help the courts in analyzing
their possible effects.
86 Id.
'7

8 See id.

89 Id. at 323. Kramer asserts that this canon should be applied first, since it is in
the best interest of every state to prevent another state's law from being rendered
entirely ineffective. Id. at 323-24.
- Id. at 324. This canon supposedly espouses the substance/procedure balance struck in the Erie framework. The canon is based on the assumption that
states generally favor substantive to procedural policies and that the principal intent of procedural law is to implement substantive law efficiently and accurately.
Id. at 324-29.
91Id. at 329. Kramer is very tentative in this proposal, specifying that he is not
advocating party choice in all situations, but rather just in cases in which there is a
potential for a true conflict. Kramer fails to acknowledge that, with the interstate
nature of contracts, a majority of contracts would probably fall under his provision, thus making his limitation practically meaningless. Id. at 329-34.

638

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[59

"D. A Canon for Laws that are Obsolete: Where one of
two conflicting laws is obsolete (i.e., inconsistent with prevailing legal and social norms in the state that enacted it),
92
the other law should be applied.
"E. A Canon for Actual Reliance Interests: Where two
laws conflict, but the parties actually and reasonably relied
93
on one of them, that law should be applied.
Kramer believes that these canons could work because
they address each state's desire to advance multistate policies and curb forum shopping. 94 He places faith on the
assumption that the states will look at the big picture of a
multistate system, and not get bogged down in protecting
their own interests in the particular case at hand. He does
acknowledge that the success of these canons of construction depends on reciprocity amongst the states. State A
would apply the canons if State B were a "canon" jurisdiction, but not otherwise.9 5
A Comprehensive Uniform Choice of Law Code Promulgatedby
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL): Although Larry Kramer has left his proposal
for multistate canons of construction on the table, he
seems to have recognized one of the obstacles to their realization - without being promulgated by a national legislative or judicial body, or being proposed by a formal
organization, there is almost no chance of their adoption
92 Id. at 334. Kramer does a good job of explaining how an obsolete statute
could technically still be in effect, stating that legislatures usually are not aware of
the situation and, even if they are, they are "too occupied with new business to
devote time to old problems that are not pressing; legislators rarely disturb the
status quo without pressure from some interested group, and the effects of obsolete laws are usually too diffuse or too sporadic to generate organized lobbying
efforts." Id. at 334. As a result, these laws stay on the books, despite their age
and inconsistency with prevailing norms.
93 Id. at 336-38.
.4 Id. at 341.
91 Id. Kramer acknowledges that states may become involved in a "choice of
law version of the prisoner's dilemma" (discussed, infra, note 169), but has faith
that they will have the patience to play the game a number of times before giving
up. Id. He adds that conditioning canons on reciprocity from sister states has the
effect of "reduc[ing] an enormously complex 50-person game into a series of
linked 2-person games." Id. at 343 n.228.
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by fifty states. Therefore, Kramer has recommended that
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), which produced the Uniform
Commercial Code, prepare a comprehensive Uniform
Choice of Law Code which could be positively enacted by
the state legislatures.96
A NCCUSL code would offer many of the advantages
that Lea Brilmayer discussed when addressing the possibility of a Third Restatement, 97 but there are some differences which make a uniform code a more attractive
option. First, each state has designated delegates on the
NCCUSL, and these representatives are aware of the interests of their state as specific provisions are negotiated.98 In addition, unlike a Restatement, a uniform code
could be positively enacted by state legislatures, thus giving it more authority and longevity. 99 Finally, those who
formulate a uniform code are not bound by existing decisions, as are drafters of a Restatement. This provides the
freedom to escape from the mistakes of the past. 0
Kramer believes that the reputation of the NCCUSL
would add credibility to a completed work and thinks that
with the prevailing dissatisfaction with the current system,
a well written code would become widely accepted relatively quickly.' 0 ' Indeed, if such a compilation is adopted
by a few important states (such as Texas, New York, Florida and California) - as was the case with the Uniform
- Kramer, supra note 9, at 2146.

See BRILMAYER, supra note 21, at 185.
98 Kramer, supra note 9, at 2148 & n.35. This distinguishes the NCCUSL from
the American Law Institute.
9 Id. Statutory codification is not the goal of a Restatement project, and thus if
legislative action is the preferable course of action, an organization like the NCCUSL would have to step to the forefront. See William Draper Lewis, History of the
97

American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the Law: "How We Did It. ", RESTATE-

19 (perm. ed. 1945) ("there has never been any desire to
give [the Restatement] statutory authority").
MENT IN THE COURTS

0 Kramer, supra note 9, at 2148; see also Lewis, supra note 99, at 19.

Kramer, supra note 9, at 2149. Kramer states that a code would be "quite
popular," but does not discuss in detail how quickly he thinks such a provision
could actually be adopted. Id.
10
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Commercial Code - other states may quickly follow.' °"
However, to date the NCCUSL has not seriously considered undertaking such a project, and there are no indications as to whether the organization will do so.
Uniform Federal Choice of Law Rules to be Imposed by the
Courts: Commentators who do not trust the states to
adopt uniform choice of law proposals on their own have
two other places to look: Congress and the federal courts.
Those who believe judicial action is appropriate have at
least three major options to consider: (1) have the
Supreme Court interpret the Constitution (especially the
Full Faith and Credit Clause) in a manner which would
place greater restrictions on the choices of law available to
0
a forum court;0'
(2) have the federal judiciary proclaim a
"federal common law" of conflicts that would bind both
state and federal courts; 10 4 or (3) have the Supreme Court
reverse Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. 105 and prescribe federal choice of law rules to govern diversity suits in federal
courts. 106

Proponents of the first approach would interpret the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to prevent a state from applying its own law even if it has some
meaningful contacts with or interest in the case, if the interests or contacts of another state are clearly more substantial. 10 7 Such action would help protect against the
forum-state overprotecting its own interests. Critics,
however, claim that this technique would seem to "oblige
the Supreme Court to 'enact' an entire jurisprudence of
conflict of laws - an enormous undertaking, which would
Id.
10.Gottesman, supra note 8, at 19 & n.73, (citing Peter Hay, Full Faith and Credit
and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REV. 709, 722 (1983)); Frederic
Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 94, 120 (1976); Willis Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity Lost, 10 HoFSTRA L. REV. 195, 201 (1981); Gary Simson, State Autonomy and Choice of Law: A
102

Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 65-66 (1978)).
104 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 20 &
n.74.
'o Id. at 20 & n.75.
(,f. Id. See generally supra note 8, at n.103.
117 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
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tax the Court's resources and institutional capacity - and
which the historical materials suggest [was] beyond the
framers' contemplation when they authored the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."' 0 8 The Supreme Court has shown no
interest whatsoever in changing its current practice.
Those who advocate a "federal common law" of choice
of law would like to see the Supreme Court, and the federal court system, set elaborate standards which would be
applicable to the states.' 0 9 Proponents claim that absent
Congressional action, the Court has the power under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the implementing statute
to specify which state's law is authoritative in any given
class of cases." 10 In fact, some believe that this is actually
a duty of the Court, and that the Court's failure to address
the choice of law issue is a "major abdication of responsibility.""' Douglas Laycock points out that "[t]here is
nothing anomalous about such a set of court-made
rules; ' " 12 and that in the past, in cases involving both
states and private parties, the court has created federal
common law to resolve interstate disputes in areas such as
boundaries and water rights." 13 Laycock goes on to say
that "[a] federal common law of choice of law to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Act would also
parallel the federal common law implementing other stat' 4
utes and constitutional clauses." "
108 Id

- Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional

Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 331 (1992); see Baxter, supra
note 2, at 40-42; Horowitz, supra note 2, at 1200-09.
110 Laycock, supra note 109, at 331.
I Id.
112

Id. at 333.

11

Id. at 333 & nn.462-64 (citing Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 111 S. Ct. 2281

(1991); Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380 (1991); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S.
124 (1987)).
"4 Id. at 333. Laycock states that the Court often "makes federal common law
to implement federal statutes, sometimes explicitly, as in the enforcement of labor
contracts, sometimes without acknowledgement [sic], as in the law of federal injunctions against state judicial proceedings, and sometimes in the guise of interpreting a silent statute, as in the law of damages and immunities under section
1983." Id. at 333-34 & nn.467-70.
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Critics, however, mention the political and practical infeasibility of such a move. In addition, they question this
interpretation of Full Faith and Credit, and contend that
the Court has no Constitutional authority to pronounce
such law." 5
The proposition to overturn Klaxon is free of many of
the attacks fired at the first two proposals; however, it creates an entirely new problem. Since the prescribed rules
would only apply to federal courts, the states would still
be free to do as they wish. The result would be to re-open
the door to the inconsistency which led to the Court's decision in Erie." 6 The American Law Institute studied the
merits of this proposal, and found that the "vice of inconsistent outcomes" overshadowed any possible benefits." 7
Some critics ofjudicial action in the choice of law arena
argue that the courts make bad rules." 8 Laycock counters
by saying that "all courts make mistakes, but where uniformity and non-discrimination are the goals, one neutral,
ultimate authority is better than fifty biased, ultimate authorities. '" ' 9 In addition, even if the court were to mess
up, lower courts would tell it so, or Congress could step
in and legislate. 20 Nonetheless, it is hard to picture the
court making a pronouncement that would cause the confusion and chaos that has become commonplace in the
2
current structure.' '
Possible Congressional Action in the Choice of Law Arena:
Some scholars believe that the United States Congress is
the appropriate venue for bringing change to the choice
of law framework. Those who prefer legislative action
Gottesman, supra note 8, at 18.
Id. at 21.
',7Id.; see, e.g., A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 166-69 app. A (1965).
"'I
Laycock, supra note 109, at 335 n.479 (citing David F. Cavers, The Changing
Choice of Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 737-38
(1963) (arguing that historical "record of the federal judiciary as umpires in cases
of conflicting state laws was far from distinguished")).
I Id.
".

120 Id.

121Id.
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claim that Congress was expressly given the power, under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to pronounce choice of
122
law rules binding on both state and federal courts.
They prefer the legislative branch to the judiciary, asserting that Congress is institutionally capable of "promulgating a code of the complexity that might be necessary to
create a coherent choice of law scheme," whereas the
Supreme Court is not. 2 3 Furthermore, Congress can construct administrative mechanisms, if needed, to assure
that the federal judiciary would not be overburdened, and
to guarantee that the language of the law would receive
consistent interpretation and application throughout the
country. 24 Finally, proponents contend that since each
state has representatives in Congress, the entire country
2 5
will have a say in the content of any new provision.
The initial question is under what authority may Congress establish choice of law standards for the states. Arthur Miller and David Crump suggest that this prerogative
comes from a number of Constitutional provisions including the due process, diversity jurisdiction, equal protection, privileges and immunities, commerce, and full faith
and credit clauses. 126 Although scholars debate whether
some of these provisions would grant such power, most of
them agree that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and especially the Effects Clause contained therein, empowers
Congress to establish choice of law rules that bind the
states.12 7 The Effects Clause states: "Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
122Gottesman, supra note 8, at 21.
123Id.

Id.
Id. at 21-22. Gottesman seems to think that each state will have a voice in
the process. He does not, however, account for the fact that certain states would
have a much greater voice due to a larger congressional delegation. It is hard to
believe that Delaware could be very successful in pushing a provision opposed by
California, New York, or Texas.
IN Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 78 (1986).
'27 Gottesman, supra note 8, at 23; Laycock, supra note 109, at 331-36; Reavley
& Wesevich, supra note 4, at 18 & n.93.
124
125
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Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."' 28 Although there is a small dissent, 29 the overwhelming consensus is that this clause gives Congress all
ts
it needs to legislate in the choice of law arena. 3
Early proposals suggested that Congress pass an
across-the-board choice of law provision. 3 ' The predominant view among scholars who support Congressional action, however, is that legislation should be adopted to
cover multistate conflicts in certain specific areas of substantive law. Michael Gottesman asserts that Congress
should take action "wherever a subject is a frequent
source of litigation with multistate implications, and the
costs of indeterminacy and/or non-neutrality have grown
*."..,
Precise fields which have been
unacceptable .
mentioned include vehicular and common carrier accidents and other mass tort cases, products liability, internal corporate affairs, medical malpractice, and toxic
torts, 33 and the list is by no means meant to be complete.
A great deal of scholastic debate focuses on the specific
standards that Congress should incorporate into a choice
of law statute. The opposing viewpoints are nothing new:
those who favor a specific, rule based system versus those
who wish to see a provision which allows the courts to
take certain "factors" into consideration. 's 4 A tighter,
more direct test would enhance predictability, uniformity,
'28

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).

Gottesman, supra note 8, at 26. Gottesman states that "[h]istorical faithfulness led Walter Wheeler Cook to conclude, with regret, that the federal choice of
law statute he favored could apply only to state statutory law, as Congress seemed
to lack power to compel obedience to another state's common law." Id.
'3o Id. at 23. Michael Gottesman states: "Scholars are virtually unanimous in
their view that Congress has the power to enact federal choice of law statutes." Id.
-3 See id. at 17 (identifying Walter W. Cook as a "proponent of a federal statute
that would dictate when one state's courts were required to enforce rights created
by another state's statutes") (citing Walter W. Cook, The Powers of Congress Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 25 YALE LJ. 421, 432-33 (1919)).
I-., at 16.
Id.
1' Id.
134 Kramer, supra note 9, at 2136-40; see also discussion on choice of law provisions included in the Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, infra notes 138-63
and accompanying text.
121
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and certainty; but such a standard could "run counter to
progressive trends in choice of law and impose a choice of
law straightjacket ...

5

on the system. An open ended,

interest considering criterion could provide the flexibility
needed in certain cases, but could also reopen the floodgates of unpredictability and uncertainty.
Another goal, and probable effect, of a legislative
choice of law provision would be to shut down certain escape devices that currently vex conflict-based litigation,
such as a public policy override, renvoi,136 and, to some
extent, characterization. 37 The law should also address
the applicability and enforceability of the states' statute of
limitations provisions.
After all that has been said about the possibility of Congressional action in the choice of law scheme, there has
only been one legislative proposal which would impose a
choice of law standard on an area of substantive law. The
Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Act 3 8 (the Bill) was
originally introduced during the 100th Congress by Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, the Wisconsin Democrat who chaired the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice (Subcommittee on Courts). 3 9
The Bill would federalize consolidation and choice of law
13.Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A
Response to "A View From the Legislature," 73 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1990).
13iGottesman, supra note 8, at 47 n.159 ("Renvoi is the practice by which the
courts in State A, having determined that State B's law ought to regulate the dispute, look to the whole law of state B rather than its substantive law (thus creating
the possibility that the substantive law of a state other than State B will be
applied)").
1.7 Id.
I'll Currently the Multiparty, Multiforum, Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 1100, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3406,
101 st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990); Originally the Court Reform and Access to justice
Act, H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
I'll
For further discussion on this Bill, see Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4
(Kastenmeier, author of the Bill, and Geyh [pronounced "jay"], former Subcommittee Counsel, argue the merits of the Bill and respond to Sedler & Twerski's
initial criticism); Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 5-8, 18-49, (arguing for the
need of such legislation, but proposing a strict "place of injury" choice of law
provision); Sedler & Twerski, supra note 135 (responding to Kastenmeier and
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for any lawsuit arising from an accident that kills or injures twenty-five or more people (who sustain at least
$50,000 in bodily or property damage) and that relates to
more than one state. The Bill would consolidate all litigation related to the particular accident into one federal forum. The federal court would then apply the choice of
law provision in the Bill (as opposed to the choice of law
provision of any particular state) to determine which one
state's substantive law would govern all claims relating to
the accident. 40 The court would try all issues of liability
and assess punitive damages, if appropriate. The transferee court would then return the case to its original forum for separate compensatory damages assessments.'14
The Kastenmeier Bill passed the House at the end of
the 100th Congress under the name "Court Reform and
Access to Justice Act of 1988" (H.R. 4807), and also
passed the House at the conclusion of the 101st Congress
under its current name (H.R. 3406). Following that vote,
the Bill appeared on the Senate consent calendar for final
passage, but was dropped from the calendar when SenaGeyh); Sedler & Twerski, supra note 5 (discussing substantial and theoretical
weaknesses in the Bill).
140No one has stated what effect the choice of law provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "FTCA"] would have on the operation of the Multiparty, Multiforum Bill. Under the FTCA, which applies to government defendants, the law of the state of conduct applies - including that state's choice of law
rules. The government is often a defendant in single collision mass tort cases,
and the FTCA would seem to prevent the law of a state other than the state of
conduct from governing all claims relating to the accident when the government
is among the defendants.
Matt Pappas, Assistant Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice [hereinafter "Senate Subcommittee"], stated in a telephone interview that he was not aware if the FTCA issue
had ever been raised in consideration of the Bill and he had never given it any
thought. Pappas assumes that the FTCA provision would prevail in the case of
government defendants, but agrees that the issue should be discussed if it has not
been already. Telephone interview with Matt Pappas, Assistant Counsel to the
Senate Subcommittee, May 13, 1993.
141See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. HI 1261-64 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (Statement of
Rep. Hughes) (Floor reading and House Debate on H.R. 2450); HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION ACT OF 1991, H. R. REP.
No. 373, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (House Committee report explaining operation and policy justification for the Bill).
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tor Howell T. Heflin, a Democrat from Alabama, objected
that his subcommittee, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, had not had
time to hold a hearing on the Bill.' 42 Congressman William Hughes, a Democrat from New Jersey, replaced Rep.
Kastenmeier as chair of the subcommittee, since renamed
"Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration."
Hughes reintroduced the bill as H.R. 2450 in the 102nd
Congress. The legislation again passed quickly and easily
through the House, but bogged down in the Senate. This
time Senator Heflin's Subcommittee held hearings on the
Bill,' 43 but the Senate Subcommittee let it die without
ever coming to a vote. Congressmen Hughes has reintroduced the Bill in the 103d Congress as H.R. 1100.144
The choice of law provision in the current version of
the Bill lists five factors a court may consider in deciding
which state's substantive law to apply, but, the Bill does
not explain the relative importance of the factors or re45
quire that a court base its decision on one of them.
112 See Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 559 & n.84. In addition to Chairman Heflin, the Senate Subcommittee consists of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum of
Ohio, Sen. Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin, Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, and Sen.
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. The Multiparty, Multiforum JurisdictionAct of
1991: Hearing on H.R. 2450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts andAdministrative Practice of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 102-982 (1992) [hereinafter
Senate Hearing Report].
143 Present to testify at the hearing on January 28, 1992 were Douglas P.
Beighle, Senior Vice President, the Boeing Company, Seattle, WA; Stephen C.
Bransdorfer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of
Justice; Lee S. Kreindler, Counsel, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, NY; Michael
S. Olin, Counsel, Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin,
Miami, FL.; Thomas M. Reavley, SeniorJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, on behalf of the Federal State Jurisdiction, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Austin, Tex.; Maurice Rosenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, New York, NY; and Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University, Detroit MI. Senate Hearing Report.
144 The Bill introduced in the 103d Congress is identical in form to the version
that passed the House of Representatives during the 102d Congress (H.R. 2450).
H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
145 The Choice of Law provision of H.R. 1100 reads as follows:
SEC. 6. CHOICE OF LAW
(A) DETERMINATION BY THE COURT. - Chapter 111 of title
28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
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Although these factors still provide room for manipulation, they are less subjective than the ten-factor choice of
law criteria included in earlier versions of the Bill.' 46 In
addition, the Bill now includes an escape clause that al1659. Choice of Law in multiparty, multiforum actions
(a) In an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or
in part, under section 1368 of this title, the district court in which
the action is brought or to which it is removed shall determine the
source of the applicable substantive law, except that if an action is
transferred to another district court, the transferee court shall determine the source of the applicable substantive law. In making this
determination, a district court shall not be bound by the choice of
law rules of any State, and the factors that the court may consider in
choosing the applicable law include (1) the place of injury;
(2) the place of the conduct causing the injury;
(3) the principal places of business or domiciles of the parties;
(4) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for forum shopping; and
(5) whether the choice of law would be reasonably foreseeable to
the parties.
The factors set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) shall be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular action. If good cause is shown in exceptional cases, including
constitutional reasons, the court may allow the law of more than one
State to be applied with respect to a party, claim, or other element of
an action.
(b) The district court making the determination under subsection
(a) shall enter an order designating the single jurisdiction whose
substantive law is to be applied in all other actions under section
1368 arising from the same accident as that giving rise to the action
in which the determination is made. The substantive law of the designated jurisdiction shall be applied to the parties and claims in all
such actions before the court, and to all other elements of each action, except where Federal law applies or the order specifically provides for the application of the law of another jurisdiction with
respect to a party, claim, or other element of an action.
(c) In an action remanded to another district court or State court
under section 1407(i)(1) or 1441(e)(2) of this title, the district
court's choice of law under subsection (b) shall continue to apply.
(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. - The table of sections at
the beginning of chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
1659. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions.
H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1993).
146 The version of Rep. Kastenmeier's bill which was passed by the House of
Representatives in both the 100th and 101st Congresses (H.R. 3406) contained
the following list of factors for a court to consider in choosing the applicable law:
(1) the law that might have governed if the jurisdiction created by
section 1367 of this title did not exist;
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lows the law of more than one state to be applied "[i]f
good cause is shown in exceptional cases, including con47
stitutional reasons."
Proponents of the Bill claim that the choice of law provisions were well thought-out, heavily reviewed, and extensively revised. They argue that the Bill addresses the
legitimate need to provide relief for an already overwhelmed judicial system.' 48 This is done while eliminating problems of forum shopping and nonuniformity.
Edward H. O'Connell, Minority Counsel for the House
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property and Judicial Administration, professes that the
(2) the forums in which the claims were or might have been
brought;
(3) the location of the accident on which the action is based and the
location of related transactions among the parties;
(4) the place where the parties reside or do business;
(5) the desirability of applying uniform law to some or all aspects of
the action;
(6) whether a change in applicable law in connection with removal
or transfer of the action would cause unfairness;
(7) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for forum
shopping;
(8) the interest of any jurisdiction in having its law apply;
(9) any reasonable expectation of a party or parties that the law of a
particular jurisdiction would apply or would not apply; and
(10) any agreement or stipulation of the parties concerning the applicable law.
H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1990).
H.R. 3406 did not include the "escape clause" that currently follows the five
factors contained in H.R. 1100. Id.
147 137 CONG. REC. H11,262 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991).
148 Any single disaster can produce a thousand lawsuits and can wreak havoc on
the courts. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 735-36 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (The number of . . . claims [is] unknown, but unofficial estimates have
placed the number at about 1,000), cited by Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 2.
During floor debate in the House, Rep. Hughes stated:
Unfortunately, we often start our day by learning that, somewhere in
the United States, a plane has crashed, a hotel has burned, or two
trains have collided. Whenever tragedies such as these occur, tens,
hundreds, and sometimes thousands of suits may be filed by the victims or their families in a multitude of State and Federal courts seeking compensation for their losses. Despite the fact that these suits
present identical issues of fact and law, there is often no way under
our current system to try all these suits in one court.
137 CONG. REC. H11,263 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991).
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"five factors" have been unfairly criticized stating: "in
most cases the appropriate law will be the law of the situs.
Except in isolated cases, the determination will not be difficult, especially for a federal judge."' 4 9
With regard to state rights, supporters also claim that in
the face of an overriding federal objective, state law is
properly displaced. 50 Even those who feel that the choice
of law provision should be modified admit that "the
norms that will be applied to determine liability in these
cases are not those of barbaric satrapies; they are rules of
law adopted by states of the Union. As such, they are not
likely to be either unjust or unfair except on the rarest
occasions."151
The bill has the support of the American Law Institute,
the judicial Conference, and the Department ofJustice.t'5
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stephen Bransdorfer,
testifying on behalf of the Department of Justice in front
of the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, stated that the choice of law provision "cuts through
the complications of 'balancing' state 'interests,' thus saving the courts time and the litigants money."' 5 3 He argued that "[v]ictims of mass torts should have similar
claims decided in a similar fashion, and should receive
prompt compensation for their injuries with a minimum
of litigating costs.' 5 4 Bransdorfer stated that the Bill
would provide much-needed certainty and that the advanI'll Interviews with Edward H. O'Connell, Minority Counsel for the House
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 18 and 19, December 15, 1993) [hereinafter O'Connell interviews].
'5"

Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4.

Senate Hearing Report, supra note 142, at 69 (prepared written statement of
Maurice Rosenberg). Professor Rosenberg testified, "[I]f the law of Alabama or
Michigan is applied, it is not going to be the law of some barbaric, outlandish
country. It is going to be the law of one of the States that is applied, and it is not
likely to be terribly unjust and unfair." Id. at 61-62.
'-'

1.1

137 CONG. REC. H1i,263 (daily ed. nov. 15, 1991) (statement of Rep.

Moorhead).
1.1 Senate Hearing Report, supra note 142, at 17 (prepared written statement of
Stephen Bransdorfer).
154

Id.

1994]

CHOICE OF LA W PROPOSALS

tages far outweigh the disadvantages.' 5 5
Critics assert that the optional, five-factor choice of law
criteria will present the same problems of indeterminacy
that plagued the states for years. They fear charges of
bias and result-orientation, similar to those charges that
have long been directed at the states. 56 Furthermore,
critics maintain that "creating a federal choice of law standard usurps the traditional role of state law in supplying
' 57
the choice of law rules that govern state law disputes."'
The Conference of Chief Justices opposes the Bill, citing the possibility of a "significant impact on the substantive rights of the parties, contrary to the holding in the
Klaxon case that diversity cases require federal courts to
apply the choice of law principles of the forum state.' 5 8
Robert Sedler argues that the Bill's choice of law provision "carves a gaping hole in Klaxon, displacing well-defined state choice of law rules with an ad hoc choice of law
determination of the 'law of a single state' by a federal
judge before whom the 'mass tort' case has been
' 59
consolidated."'
Other critics, Thomas M. Reavley and Jerome W.
Wesevich, agree with the Bill's authors that Congress has
the right to enact such a provision, but argue that the Bill
should contain a strict territorial or law-based choice of
law provision to check judicial discretion. Reavley and
Id. at 23. Bransdorfer calls the Bill a "substantial step forward." Id.
Sedler & Twerski, supra notes 5, 135.
1-17 Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 564 (paraphrasing the objections of
Sedler and Twerski).
1.1 Senate Hearing Report, supra note 142, at 20 (resolution XIII of the Conference of ChiefJustices). The Senate Hearing Report includes a copy of a letter to
Sen. Heflin from Robert N.C. NixJr., ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and President of the Conference of ChiefJustices. Id. at 19. The letter
states that the Bill would interfere with the traditional tort law responsibility of
the states "by authorizing bifurcated trials, and injecting federal courts into determining substantive rights of parties, all of this without a clear demonstration of
need, or of inadequate response by the states." Id.
1511
Id. at 95 (prepared written statement of Robert A. Sedler). Sedler asserted
that, in the end, "the [B]ill would destroy completely the basic premise of Die and
Klaxon that in a case where federal jurisdiction is founded solely on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, there should be uniformity of result between state and
federal courts." Id.
'.-

1s
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Wesevich propose that "all claims arising from each single-accident mass tort be "governed by the substantive
law of the State where the accident physically harms the
greatest number of natural persons."'' 60 They claim such
a rule would foster uniformity, efficiency, determinability,
6
and fairness.' '
As can be deduced from the various arguments, the effects of the Multiparty, Multiforum Bill, if passed, remain
uncertain. Currently the system can be described as "two
tiered confusion;" the court must first decide which state's
choice of law provision to apply, and then determine the
applicable substantive law. Both of these tests are often
complicated, and present various issues for litigation.
The Bill would eliminate the first "tier" of this analysis.
In a mass tort situation, the Bill's choice of law provision
would apply, and the only task for the court would be to
determine which substantive law should govern. By eliminating the number of issues to be litigated, the Bill could
eventually lighten the load on the federal judicial system.
By providing that mass tort cases will be heard in one
federal court, the Bill places the choice of law determination in the hands of the federal judiciary. These judges
will have the opportunity to develop expertise on the matter and will be removed somewhat from the parochial interests of the states. Over time, patterns would develop in
the interpretation and application of the choice of law
rules. Eventually it could be possible to predict with some
certainty which state's substantive law would apply in a
given situation. This would allow potential tort defendants to have some idea about what substantive law would
govern their actions.
If the Bill were passed and implemented, choice of law
scholars would have an opportunity to analyze its results.
' Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 43.
1I6Id. at 43-44 (claiming such a provision "facilitates perfectly uniform legal
standards ... is impervious to after-the-fact manipulation by parties or courts ...
is also highly determinate .... fosters efficiency ....
(and) rests on solid constitutional and theoretical ground").
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Mass tort cases would be placed in the academic
"fishbowl," and the Bill's effects would be closely examined, with the debate focused on what has actually
taken place. This transition from the hypothetical to the
practical would definitely be a step in the right direction.
As a result, other initiatives could eventually follow, leading to positive change in the choice of law arena.
It has yet to be seen whether the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act will clear its Senate hurdle. To
have repeatedly passed through the House without dissent, one of two things must have occurred: either there
was an overall consensus in support of the Bill, or no one
really knew what they were voting for. O'Connell personally thinks that Senator Heflin has felt plenty of pressure
from a small portion of the plaintiffs bar to keep the Bill
from ever reaching the floor. 162 In addition, Sen. Heflin
seemed to be bothered by some of the testimony on the
Bill, especially that which referred to its effect on his
home state of Alabama. 163 However, it may just be that in
a country with plenty of political problems, this Bill is just
not a high priority. Regardless, the Bill is one attempt to
address a choice of law problem and try to do something
about it. That alone is a start.
162 O'Connell Interviews, supra note 149. O'Connell interprets a Heflin staffer's
comment that "certain practitioners have expressed concern" to mean that there
has become a certain level of pressure from PAC's (Political Action Committees)
representing various legal constituencies who oppose the bill. Id.
16. Sen. Heflin seemed especially bothered by the following hypothetical
presented by Robert Sedler: An Alabama bus carrying a group of Alabamians
(and one Mississippian) crosses into Mississippi and is involved in a collision with
a truck driven by a Mississippi driver. Sedler claims that under the Bill's choice of
law provisions, Alabama would not be able to apply its law to the claim of the
Alabama parties, stating that "Alabama's sovereignty, its strong policy, is going to
be thwarted." Senate Hearing Report, supra note 142, at 119. As Sen. Heflin
noted, Alabama may be the only state in the Union where in a wrongful death case
the measure of damages is punitive in nature alone; no compensatory damages
are allowed. Throughout the hearing, Heflin appears concerned that this and
other Alabama laws may not be applied. Id. at 120.
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III. CERTAIN REALITIES WHICH WILL KEEP A
UNIFORM CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION FROM
EVER BEING AN ACTUALITY: DEAL BREAKERS
Despite the fact that the choice of law system has been
harshly criticized, for the most part we can expect to see
more of the same for a long time to come. If states had an
interest in change, it would have already begun to take
place. After all, the problems are nothing new. The majority of states, however, are much more concerned in
protecting their own interests than in developing a multistate conflicts provision. Those states who do desire a different system are stuck in what scholars describe as a
prisoners dilemma. 64 On the federal level, the courts
have far too much of a caseload to worry about pronouncing a uniform standard in an area as controversial as
choice of law. In addition, even if the Supreme Court
were to decide it wanted to promulgate a choice of law
provision, getting a majority of justices to agree on its
content could be a nightmare. Finally, Choice of Law is
just not a priority on Capitol Hill. This is the type of issue
that most politicians would rather leave alone - one that
brings very few political benefits, while exposing some obvious risks. Finally, no one knows for sure what effect a
uniform choice of law provision would have on our legal
system, and there is a fear of the unknown which provides
resistance against change.
Those hoping to see the states create a uniform choice
of law structure on their own will probably never see their
dream come alive. Currently, the Second Restatement, which
was once thought to be the answer, is followed by only
46% of the states. Getting the highest court of fifty different states to apply the same choice of law provision without a national mandate simply is not a feasible alternative.
Each state views itself as an independent sovereign; even
though the fifty states are regarded as co-equals, subordinating one state's law to that of another violates the prem'"

See infra note 169.
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ise of sovereign equality. 65 In addition, only one state,
Louisiana (in 1992), has passed legislation expressing
state policy on a choice of law issue (conflict in tort
laws).166 Otherwise, state legislatures have left this domain to the courts. As for the people, "the lack of theoretical consensus, propensity for wholesale rule revision,
and general confusion that pervade this area of law make
it unlikely that those (state choice of law) policies are understood or embraced as high order state concerns by the
states or their respective citizens. "167
In many areas of substantive law, states are more interested in protecting their own interests than in honoring
multistate concerns. For example, in the area of torts,
"the differences from one state to another are not mere
matters of detail, but affect basic issues of duty, standard
of care, causation, affirmative defenses, and recoverable
damages . . . [all] high order policy decisions."'' 68 State
courts face the political reality that if they won't protect
these interests, no one will.
When the states get involved in multistate considera169
tions, they are often stuck in a prisoner's dilemma.
165Kramer, supra note 9, at 2142-43.
1C11
Louisiana, a civil-law state, has adopted a new statutory scheme dealing with
choice of law in tort cases. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of
Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992).
167Reavley & Wesevich, supra note 4, at 20-21.
I- Sedler & Twerski, supra note 135, at 629.
The "prisoners dilemma" involves the following hypothetical situation:
X and Y are arrested on suspicion of having committed a serious
offense. Without a confession, the District Attorney has only
enough evidence to obtain a conviction on a lesser included offense.
The DA therefore puts X and Y in separate cells and offers each a
deal whereby if one confesses and the other does not, the confessor
will get three months imprisonment while the silent partner gets five
years; if both confess, they will both get two years; and if neither
confesses, they will both get six months.
If X and Y could coordinate their responses to the DA, they would
probably agree that neither of them should confess. To be sure,
each one might want to hold out for the option in which he confesses
and his compatriot does not, since this gives the confessing prisoner
the shortest possible sentence. This might even happen if there was
a great disparity in bargaining power or if a side-deal could be arranged. (For example, if X can have Y killed, X can give Y a choice
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Since they do not know how other jurisdictions will respond, the states must prepare a strategy: they may either
follow their own law (and sacrifice multistate considerations altogether), apply the law of another jurisdiction
(and run the risk that the other forum does not), or adopt
some type of proposed choice of law provision (and hope
that other states reciprocate). Larry Kramer states that
"the states could appoint representatives to negotiate a
cooperative choice of law solution, but they have not done
so. Instead, the states have left the choice of strategies to
the judges."'' 7 0 Knowing the risk of getting burned all too
well, many judges will take the safe way out - and nothing will change.
As for the federal judiciary, there is simply not enough
time in the day to worry about a uniform choice of law
provision. The parameters of any new law are normally
tested through litigation, and the courts have no desire to
add to their existing monumental caseloads. If such a
standard were to be adopted, it would probably have to
come from the Supreme Court. This will not occur. The
Court has expressed no interest in getting involved in this
between death and five years.) But absent such circumstances, and if
there is any willingness to cooperate, the obvious solution is for
neither X nor Y to confess.
Game theory nonetheless posits that if X and Y do not consult,
they will both confess and go to jail for two years. Consider the situation from X's perspective: If Y confesses and X remains silent, X
goes to jail for five years; by confessing, X can lower this sentence to
two years. If Y does not confess and X remains silent, X goes to jail
for only six months; but if X takes advantage of Y's silence and confesses, X can reduce this sentence to three months. X is better off
confessing no matter what Y does. Moreover, because the situation
is symmetrical, Y faces the same array of possible outcomes. Therefore X and Y will confess.
Interestingly, because X and Y acted rationally, both are worse off:
if both had cooperated by remaining silent, they would have gotten
only six months. But without the opportunity to negotiate, neither
can afford to take this risk. Because each is choosing only his own
strategy, he must confess or run the risk that the other player will (in
which case he goes to jail for five years). This risk makes defection
rational under the circumstances.
Kramer, supra note 39, at 341.
170 Id.
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area. 17 ' This is possibly due in part to the fact that a majority of the bench could never agree on one overriding
choice of law provision.
Congress has virtually no incentive to enter into the
choice of law fray. As the Multiparty, Multiforum Act
shows, even a Bill which would apply to a very small, but
very important area of law, can sit on the table for years.
Most people simply don't care about the politics of choice
of law. Even corporate defendants, who are often victims
of the system, have bigger cards on their political table.
As Douglas Laycock stated:
Congress may be expected to leave the (choice of law)
problem to common law because there are no votes to be
gained by resolving it. The victims of discriminatory
choice of law decisions are a dispersed and anonymous
minority, many of them victimized only once, incapable of
organizing as a political force. The victims who could organize, such as insurance companies and product manufacturers, 72 are more concerned with other political
agendas. 1
The only pressure Congress (especially the Senate) has
acknowledged is that applied by groups of attorneys, who
are major contributors to Congressional re-election treasuries. Therefore, it makes sense that a Congressman
would not want to risk losing monetary support on a "no
glamour" piece of legislation. Even in areas on the "cutting edge" such as products liability, Congress has been
unable to reach a solution, even though members of citizen groups and the news media have been breathing
down their necks. Given the current political climate,
Congress believes it has far more important issues to deal
with than choice of law, and is probably right in that
determination.
-7'See
172

Laycock, supra note 109, at 331-34.
Id. at 334 (citing Bruce B. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.

REV. 713 (1985) arguing that dispersed and anonymous minorities lack the ability
to organize as an interest group or voting block, an ability that gives discrete and
insular minorities power disproportionate to their numbers).
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Finally, even though scholars have written mountains of
critical commentary on the current choice of law system,
choice of law seems, at a minimum, understandable and
workable. This is not the case with the possible repercussions of any new uniform provision. As Patrick Bradley
said: "No system is perfect, but it could be worse.
Although the simplification of choice of law is a worthwhile goal, the result could possibly be more complex.
It's like the monster in the closet: if you leave it alone,
73
you'll be O.K.; if you mess with it, you never know....1
The monster would probably be spending a great deal of
time in the court system.
CONCLUSION: STICKING WITH THE STATUS
QUO - NO DEAL!
The choice of law system in the United States is far
from ideal. Each state seems to apply a different standard
in a different fashion. This leads to claims of forum shopping, unpredictability, uncertainty, bias toward state interests, and nonuniformity - just to name a few of the
problems. As a result, scholars and practitioners have
called for a change to a uniform choice of law provision,
on the state or federal level. For various reasons, such a
solution does not appear on the horizon. In the mass tort
context, Linda S. Mullenix admits that "such is the nature
of the task that even perennial optimists are skeptical
whether law reformers will be able to achieve a consensus
solution to this choice of law problem in the near future."'174 The same can be said for choice of law in
general.
What's behind door number two? We don't know. The
topic is one that will undoubtedly be addressed for the
months and years to come. As bad as the system suppos17-1 Bradley interview, supra note 43. This discussion with Bradley initially
brought the "Let's Make a Deal" metaphor to mind. He talks as if many attorneys
are afraid to find out what a uniform provision would be like, because it could
even be worse than what we have today. Id.
174 Mullenix, supra note 4, at 1627.
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edly is, our legislative and judicial decisionmakers would
rather cling to it than venture into the unknown. For
now, the "chickens" are just going to hold on to what
they've got. This leaves us wondering what's out there:
the big deal of the day, or just another zonk.
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